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Abstract
Despite the rapid success of its growth over the past four decades, the People’s Republic
of China is facing new political, economic and societal problems. In these turbulent times of
change and upheaval, nationalism has re-emerged as a significant force within China,
spearheaded by the new regime under President Xi Jinping. This paper examines how a more
offensive-oriented nationalism and several subcategories of nationalism are slowly seeping into
the aforementioned aspects of modern China. It argue that unlike the defensive nationalism
that China adopted over a century ago, this new wave of offensive nationalism is tied directly to
the desire to transform China into a global power reminiscent of the old imperial dynasties.
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Introduction
The years 2012 and 2013 were crucial times for those writing about the Asia-Pacific
region, as nearly all eyes lay upon the ongoing South China Sea disputes. The uninhabitable
islands of the South China Sea, rumored to be rich in natural resources, sparked a dramatic
international spectacle as nearby nations sought to claim the islands for themselves. And no
neighboring nation involved in the dispute was nearly as intimidating as the People’s Republic
of China. With the outbreaks of major disputes in 2013, China flexed its muscles with regards to
the South China Sea, taking the world stage in an attempt to lay claim to what the Chinese
government believed was its rightful territory, even butting heads with neighboring Southeast
Asian countries. And in the East China Sea, another dispute was being waged with Japan over
another set of uninhabited islands. Any and all attempts at settling the disputes through
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diplomacy grounded to a stalemate for the next three years, even as major international
powers such as the United States, the E.U., and Russia sought mediation. In the summer of
2016, a U.N Tribunal was called to solve a particular dispute between China and the Philippines
over the Scarborough Shoal island chain in the South China Sea. And while the U.N. ruled that
China had no historical claims to the Scarborough Shoal and continued to back the smaller
nations in the region, China’s posture remained intimidating.1
In the two years that followed, most of the political and international drama died down.
The disputes in the region remain unsolved though, and while there was no longer any active
hostility in the region at the moment, talks continued to take place behind closed doors. But by
2018, another major development had occurred in the Asia-Pacific region, once again centered
on China. Since coming to power in 2012, President Xi Jinping had initiated several sweeping
changes to China, the most prominent of which was his anti-corruption campaign, a campaign
designed to weed out corruption within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), but what many
observers simply saw as a crackdown on Xi’s political rivals. And it was under Xi’s administration
that a new wave of disputes within the South and East China Sea reemerged as a global issue.
Most shocking of all, in March of 2018, the CCP announced that the typical term limit of two
five-year terms would be abolished, allowing acting President Xi Jinping to serve as president
for life, while also giving him and his loyal cabinet members a much wider reach of both power
and influence within the CCP.2 Many observers believed that these “sweeping changes” will
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greatly extend the reach of the Chinese state and by extension the CCP, to all levels of
government, from the national assembly all the way down to county-level governments, and
could “significantly infringe on Chinese citizen’s [basic] human rights.”3
To the casual observer of these various events as told through the mainstream news,
the majority of the modern disputes within the both the South and East China Sea revolve
around the acquisition of potential resources for economic and strategic importance. And the
changes to the inner working of the CCP under Xi’s administration may be seen as nothing more
than an assertive effort to increase his own power while limiting that of his opponents. There is
truth to both these statements. Hidden beneath the surface of both events, however, is the
significant role that nationalism and past reclamation play in these drastic changes. Nationalism
can both unify a nation against a common enemy and divide people within a state based on
who is considered part of a particular nation. It restructures how a nation views itself and the
rest of the world and is a cultural force that reshapes how the nation evolves. With these
factors in mind, this paper dedicates itself to focusing on the changes within the People’s
Republic of China through the multifaceted lens of nationalism.
As China’s economic growth continues to slow down and international pressure mounts
regarding disputes such as those in the South China Sea, the Chinese government is shifting
from champions of the proletariat to champions of the Chinese nation. The current regime of
the CCP under Xi Jinping seeks to remake China into the superpower that it once was, to “Make
China Great Again.” The goals of this paper then are to showcase how variations of nationalism
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are reshaping the Chinese state at the political, international, and societal level. To formulate
these claims, this project asks four important questions:
1) What were/are the major variations of nationalism prevalent in modern China?
2) How have the variations of nationalism begun to reshape and reconfigure as China
became a major world power?
3) What major changes has nationalism brought to the inner workings of Chinese society,
culture, and the CCP?
And 4) How has and will Chinese nationalism continue to affect China’s foreign policy
and the spread of its influence across both the Asia-Pacific region and the world?
So why is this paper so important to the development of Asia-Pacific knowledge? We are
continuing to see the effect of nationalism on nation-states in the Asia-Pacific region, from
renewed Japanese militarism to rising Hindu nationalism in India. In China, both ethnic and civic
nationalism are being utilized by the current administration to create a revitalized sense of
pride during a period of new security threats and potential conflict for hegemony in the AsiaPacific region. This analysis serves not only to educate, but to offer a cautionary tale of the
consequences and potential dangers of rising nationalism in China. Asia has already gone down
a dark path of ultra-nationalism in the previous century, and those who do not learn from
history are doomed to repeat it. Will China continue down this path and will the other world
powers simply sit back or take action?

Nationalism: Building a New Discourse
The subject of Chinese nationalism is not new to the research about the Asia-Pacific
region. Whenever the term “Chinese nationalism” is brought up, particular attention is given to
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ethnic nationalism in China, especially among the Han Chinese. Ethnic nationalism was one of
the first variations of nationalism that emerged from China at the dawn of the twentieth
century; due to the fact that ethnic nationalism is also the most common variant of nationalism,
this makes it an easy and reliable source of discourse on nationalism as a whole within China’s
recent history and present day events. Ethnic nationalism is not limited to just the majority Han
Chinese. Sources such as Rong Ma’s “A Han vs. Minorities Dual Structure of Chinese Society”
and Michael Clarke’s “The Impact of Ethnic Minorities on Chinas Foreign Policy” discuss the
rising nationalism within prominent minority ethnic groups in China, particularly the Tibetans
and Uyghurs, and how the ethnic nationalism and separatism from these groups contribute to
the Chinese government’s responses to both internal and external issues. However, existing
discourse gives less attention to other variations of nationalism; this project examines several
of these variations and how they fit into the context of China and the current administration’s
vision for the country.
One key question asked in this paper pertains to China’s foreign policy and international
relations, and how nationalism and its variations are reshaping China’s view of the outside
world. The South China Sea dispute of the past few years is just one example where nationalism
from both China and neighboring countries has played a role in international relations, and, as a
result, has become a major focus of academics. The work of political scientist Graham Allison
serves as a catalyst to provide an answer the question of China’s foreign policy. His latest book
Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap delves into the current
tumultuous relationship between the United States and China, as well as the reasoning behind
China’s recent shift in international relations from one of soft power to one of domineering
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physical presence.4 In his research, he states that China seeks to become a superpower, one to
rival the pre-colonial imperial dynasties of old, and something that the CCP can draws upon to
inspire pride in their nation.5 My research into the variants of nationalism affecting China will
shed further light on the country’s shifting foreign policy making.
Another key question asked pertains to China’s internal political structuring and social
dynamics. It is no secret that China is facing many internal problems within its society beyond
the ethnic nationalism of some minority groups mentioned previously. At the same time, the
CCP under Xi Jinping is continuing to undergo massive reforms and restructuring to cement Xi’s
control over a factionalized party. Jiayu Wang’s discourse from the National University of
Singapore delves into the internal changes.6 According to his research, Wang believes that the
current wave of Chinese nationalism is part of a top-down approach implemented by Xi’s
administration in the pursuit of his “China Dream” since the old Marxist principles no longer
have the same influence as before.7 Similar works included in this paper dedicate some time to
discuss the internal strife that China is currently afflicted by. These internal troubles will be
included in portions of this paper, as these issues and events shape the nationalistic growth
within the Chinese state.
Other major sources include Benedict Anderson and the influence his work Imagined
Communities has had on defining nationalism in the social sciences. This project will analyze
Anderson’s concept of the nation, elaborate upon its implications, and explore how his theory
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compares to those of similar works. Ultimately, this paper will expand upon the research on
nationalism, China’s foreign policy, and internal structuring previously touched upon by various
sources to create a new discourse focused on the other variants of nationalism that have
emerged within a globalized Chinese state.

Communist Rule, the Economic Miracle, and a Shift in the Nation
To understand why the CCP under Xi is currently shifting away from traditional Marxist
principles and towards more nationalistic rhetoric, it is important to briefly discuss the history
of the CCP to understand why nationalistic rhetoric has reemerged. On October 1st, 1949 at the
proclamation of the People’s Republic of China, Mao Zedong “announced that the Chinese
people had finally stood up against repeated foreign invasion” and united the country under
one government with one ideology.8 Over the next few decades, the CCP under Mao launched
massive campaigns to bring China up to the standards of western nation in agriculture and
industry. While the initial years saw a great deal of success for some levels of society, the failure
of the idealistic ambitions of the Great Leap Forward and the millions of death fueled by the
resulting famine proved major setbacks for the country. While retaining a small part within
Chinese society, Chinese national identity was greatly overshadowed by Maoist ideology;
Chinese national identity received a devastating blow during the decade-long Cultural
Revolution of the 1960’s and 70’s, when hordes of students and violent revolutionaries
attempted to destroy the history, culture, and identity of the people living within the country.
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The chaos of the Cultural Revolution ended with the death of Mao in 1976. In the
following decades under more moderate leaders such as Deng Xiaoping, China opened itself up
to the world, undergoing a radical transformation that left it unrecognizable from the
communist state that Mao had envisioned. Despite still being under an authoritarian
government, “economic pragmatism” became the primary focus of the government’s agenda;9
the economy grew rapidly in three decades that followed as once quiet fishing villages morphed
into million-resident metropolises in just a few short years. But as the decades passed, as
China’s economy continued to grow and new generations of Chinese citizens were maturing, a
major shift in ideals was also occurring under the surface.
The old Marxist principles of the Mao era, the very principles that had defined the entire
nation and the central government since 1949, no longer had the same power they once had.
The younger generations were now living in a world where China was no longer the isolationist
communist state that their parents and grandparents had grown up in. As China emerged onto
the globalized world stage, opportunities outside of China presented themselves as new and
fresh perspectives on economics, politics, and society that people never had in China before.
These young and ambitious Chinese men and women were at the least apathetic to and, in
some cases, outright opposed to the Marxist principles of old, most prominently demonstrated
at Tiananmen Square in 1989. This sudden and dramatic shift in China’s appearance caused
what Ruoxi Du calls an “identity crisis among the Chinese people.”10 Without the strong
charisma and personality cult of a leader such as Mao, Chinese citizens of various ethnic
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backgrounds had to look elsewhere to find meaning and order in their lives, and they found
answers from a variety of both native and foreign influences Other factors divided Chinese
society such as “elite families, different factional groups, [and] regional clustering.”11
The nationalism of the past was not immune to this change either; after decades of
peace and prosperity, and with no other nation threatening to invade or conquer China, the
nationalism that once spurred on revolutionaries to overthrow the imperial dynasty fell out of
favor. Despite their attempts to reinvent the party into one that represents the Chinese nation,
the central government seemed to solely focus on internal security and economic prosperity.
But such rapid economic growth could not last forever. This can be seen in recent years up until
now. As the country has emerged onto the globalized world, China currently faces a number of
increasingly perilous social challenges, including but not limited to a widening generational gap,
aging population, gender imbalance, pollution, ethnic separatism, and transnational security
threats.12 The world of the 21st is becoming an increasingly unpredictable and tumultuous. And
from the beginning of 2010 to the present, nationalism is on the rise again in China, serving as a
unifying force for the people, but of a different sort than before.

Offensive Nationalism: Xi Jinping and the Dream of China
The birth of this new form of nationalism was catalyzed by some key events in recent
history. In November of 2012, at the Eighteenth Party Congress of the CCP, Xi Jinping was
elected General Secretary of the People’s Republic of China.13 His goals for the transformation
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of China and the CCP were made evident during his rule through the Four Comprehensives,
which centered on four components of China: the prosperity of Chinese society, reform, rule by
law, and loyalty to the CCP.14 As part of his bid to achieve these goals, Xi has wasted no effort in
concentrating an increasing amount of power and authority over all aspects of the Chinese
state either directly or through his supporters. From this position, Xi and his administration can
administer the various reforms that achieve the Four Comprehensives through a centralized
top-down approach.15 Perhaps the most famous of these reforms are the various anticorruption campaigns spearheaded by Xi, which not coincidentally targeted those who were
not the most supportive of him.16
Observers have noted how these action mirror similar actions taken under Mao Zedong;
as Willy Lam states in his article dissecting Xi’s political ideology, Xi Jinping pictures himself on
equal footing with Mao Zedong, centralizing power around him and building what can amount
to a personality cult following within China.17 Since 2012, the authority and status of Xi Jinping
has continued to rise within the CCP, and his efforts to increase the centralization of power on
reached a climax earlier this year when it was announced that the CCP had abolished the limit
of two five-year terms for its presidents.18 Observers within China are concerned, as Xi is
undoing the safeguards put in place to ensure that another Mao figure would not rise again,
and has essentially become the de facto Emperor of China.19
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But despite his goal of increasing the influence of Marxist-Leninist ideology within China
and the personality cult surrounding him, Xi faces challenges to increasing his hold on the rest
of China outside the CCP. As stated earlier, since the 1980’s, Chinese people were beginning to
lose faith in the CCP;20 and while China’s government is certainly authoritarian, no observer
today would argue that China’s rapid success and growth under capitalist economic principles
still classifies it as a communist country anymore. Additionally, rising social and economic
challenges as mentioned previously also put Xi in a dangerous position to keep the country
together as they head towards an uncertain future.
So what legitimacy does Xi Jinping have in his attempt to grab and maintain his power
over the rest of the country? With the decline of Marxist principles and an increasing
uncertainty about the future of the country, Xi and his administration are turning to an old
ideology that once served China in a similar time of rapid change and uncertainty:
nationalism.21 But this variant of nationalism is not the same one that revolutionaries such as
Sun Yat-sen proposed over a century ago to unify the Chinese nation in defense of foreign
threats to Chinese soil. The focus has shifted. Now, nationalism in China under Xi is no longer
content with simply preserving the Chinese nation. Xi’s nationalism proposes that the best
defense is a good offense. It now seeks to expand beyond its existing borders and carve out a
place for China on the world stage. This metamorphosis into offensive nationalism is displayed
through three aspects of Xi’s evolving China: the “Chinese Dream,” mass education programs,
and a more aggressive foreign policy.
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What exactly is the “China Dream” that Xi espouses to the nation? Xi describes it as “the
great revival of China” to become a country that can truly stand on equal terms with the
developed countries of the western world.22 Author Jiayu Wang describes the “Chinese Dream”
as China under Xi “striving to regain its past glories during its long history of civilization.” 23 With
over 5000 years of history to draw from, Xi uses this history to point out the moments when
China stood as the apex of civilized nations and the center of the enlightened world. Unlike the
nationalism espoused by intellectuals of Sun Yat-sen’s era and the Maoist principles of the CCP,
which ranged from apathetic to outright hostile towards China’s imperial and cultural past, the
variant of nationalism in Xi’s “Chinese Dream” is “communicated through the symbolic
representation of national history;” it speaks of a “shared past based on the common past of
the [Chinese] community,” with the CCP as the watchful guardians against any who would
oppose the dreams of the nation.24 For Xi and the current CCP administration, the offensive
nationalism that forms the basis of the “Chinese Dream” acts as the modern-day mandate of
heaven, a reference to the old Chinese imperial dynastic system in determining if a ruler was
legitimate.
Despite the millennial generation of Chinese citizens not being easily persuaded by the
CCP’s rhetoric, Xi is fully aware of the influence that his administration can still have on the
current Generation Z and those who come after. Within the first few years of coming to power,
Xi initiated reforms that helped him push certain educational campaigns. Officially, this
education reform campaign is designed to reinforce the Marxist principles that Xi and the party
22

Wang, “Xi Jinping’s ‘China Dream’ Discourse,” 831.
Ibid., 832.
24
Ning Liao, “Presentist or Cultural Memory: Chinese Nationalism as Constraint on Beijing's Foreign Policy Making,”
Asian Politics and Policy 5, no. 4 (2013): 546-47.
23

14

officially espouse. But tying these education reforms back to the “China Dream” rhetoric of the
CCP, the new education materials glorify China’s imperial past when the country served as the
hegemon of the East Asian sphere.25 But the influence Xi’s nationalism has on the newer
members of Chinese society does not stop there. Author Ning Liao states that in the wake of
the “belief crisis” that affected China after Tiananmen Square in 1989, the common past of the
nation served as a unifying force for the Chinese people.26
And while most millennials are not as easily swayed by the Marxist rhetoric of the CCP,
some are more supportive of their government than others, especially on the worldwide web.
Using the internet as a staging ground, young Chinese nationalists in the recent years under Xi
Jinping have taken to their keyboard in defense of their country. These digital warriors are
called “Little Pink” within China, are can often be found ardently defending China on the
internet against any and all criticism.27 Watch any video on YouTube or other social media
platforms criticizing any aspect of mainland China, and you are guaranteed to see these “Little
Pink” leaving angry comments and smashing the down-vote buttons. Though there is no
connection between the “Little Pink” users and any CCP government organization, the young
activists are having praise heaped on them by state-run media
In addition, the newer educational material under Xi’s reforms, including revised school
textbooks, go to great lengths to portray China as the victim of past oppression by foreign
powers and invaders.28 Its goal is to remind the Chinese that they are and continue to be
victims of oppression by foreign powers that seek to keep China weak and contained, a fear
25
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that Xi and the CCP use to great effect during various disputes with other countries. The Second
Sino-Japanese War during the 1930’s and 40’s is a major focal point of this victimization
narrative in both the newer state-sponsored education and propaganda. There is an overt
amount of anti-Japanese propaganda laced into the material, and the memory of the Second
Sino-Japanese War is still carried by the old leaders of the CCP;29 in addition, the role of the
communist party during the war is greatly exaggerated within the material. The purpose of this
exaggerated material ties into the main goal of Xi’s nationalism: to preserve the authority of the
CCP by portraying them as the saviors of China who defeated the foreign invaders and
destroyed the corrupt enemies from within.
The combined influence of Xi’s “China Dream,” mass education campaigns, and
victimization all contribute to the rise of a more offensive-oriented nationalism that has
replaced the old Marxist thought that attempted to unify the Chinese nation in order to stand
on par with the rest of the world.

The Dawn of Nationalism
Nationalism is certainly on the rise within Xi’s China, and it is changing many aspects of
the country internally in order to both cement the rule of Xi Jinping and expand his vision for
the future of the Chinese nation. But before examining how this new wave of Chinese
nationalism under Xi is currently reshaping the country’s foreign policy, it is crucial to first
establish firm definitions of nationalism, the nation, and what the properties of these variations
are along with an understanding of how these ideologies came to dominate much of the China
29
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in both the past and present. This section will be followed by a historical section on how
nationalism first made its impact on Chinese history prior to the rise of the CCP to power; it will
ties in past events of Chinese nationalism to Xi’s present image for China before shifting to a
final section discussing China’s changing foreign policy and more aggressive posturing.
Benedict Anderson provides insight into how the foundational idea of the nation and
nationalism first arose.30 And while his work was first published back in 1983, when China was
first starting to open up under Deng Xiaoping, his examination of nationalism presented in Asia
is crucial for understanding what is happening in China under Xi Jinping today. Anderson
describes the nation as “an imagined political community- and imagined as both inherently
limited and sovereign.”31 In layman’s terms, the nation is an artificial invention born of the
imagination of a people who share similar linguistic, cultural, and historical backgrounds.32
Theses shared backgrounds are compiled to form a national identity; and nationalism in turn is
the force that invents and advocates for said nations and national identities. 33
What differentiates the nation from other cultural groups such as ethnicities and
religions is that nations are, by their nature, more political and rooted in concepts such as
sovereignty and legitimacy.34 A nation is not the same as a state however, the latter of which is
merely an organized political entity that rules over a territory under its control. And yet, this
relationship between nations and states has become synonymous with the current political
world. There are states that have a predominant nation living within them (nation-states),
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states compromised of multiple nations living within them (multinational states), and even
nations without states to call their own. China is a good example of a multinational state;
despite the majority percentage that the Han Chinese composes of the state’s population,
millions of people within the state identify themselves as distinct from the majority Han
Chinese.
The concepts of the nation and nationalism are relatively new in a broad historical
context, yet their impacts have been profound to say the least. Prior to the invention of the
nation, states were the primary political entities for most of human history. Anderson suggests
that the primary systems that drove the function of these pre-national states were the religious
community (including the sacredness of language and the church) and the dynastic realm (ideas
such as the divine right of kings).35 This system was present in China too through imperial
dynastic succession and the role that traditional Chinese language had in the government. But a
little over 250 years ago, starting in Western Europe, these two cultural systems that had for so
long formed the bedrock of traditional states began to erode. Movements such as the
Reformation and Scientific Revolution weakened the influence of religious communities on
European societies; inventions such as the printing press meant that access to language and
knowledge was no longer reserved for a select few. And the Enlightenment brought with it the
idea that the sovereignty of a state no longer had to rely on the divine right of its ruler, but on
the consent of the people living within the state.36
Anderson and others are correct in stating that the nation and national identity are, by
their very nature, social constructs. But what makes the idea of nationalism and national
35
36
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identity so powerful to both individuals and collective groups ties back to one of humankind’s
most basic instincts: the desire to belong. Human beings are, by their own nature, social
creatures. The decline of both traditional state and religious institutions, as well as the greater
access to knowledge afforded to individuals, were the primary driving forces behind the
creation of the nation, national identity, and nationalism. With the traditional elements that
previously united the European states cut out of the equation, the more educated masses
within these states began to look at what united them as a whole. Elements such as language,
symbols, literature, and traditions became unifiers of particular groups of people in the
thousands and millions that had never existed before, no longer confined to just a single tribe,
village, or region according to Anderson.37 A similar phenomenon occurred in China both after
the fall of the Qing in 1912 and in the years following the rejection of traditional Marxist
principles post-1980 mentioned by Ruoxi Du previously.38 And thus, the nation and national
identity were born into fruition, and nationalism emerged to ensure that the identity would not
become lost.
Despite the negative aura that surrounds it today and its link to the tragedies of the past,
nationalism is not inherently evil or malicious in its intentions or values. There are examples
throughout history that showcase how nationalism and the creation of national identities acted
as forces of good. It was nationalism that united dozens of divided states in Europe into the
modern nation-states of France, Germany, and Italy that are well known today. It was
nationalism that enabled the previously subjugated peoples of old empires to throw off their
shackles and carve out a place for themselves in the modern world. It is also important to note
37
38
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that nationalism does not exist in a vacuum; it does not solely evolve in one particular direction,
a theme that is vital for understanding the purpose of this paper. From its origins in 17thcentury Western Europe, the concept of the nation and nationalism was exported across the
world during the 19th and 20th centuries during the age of imperialism. And it is here that this
story returns to China and the origins of a national identity.

Defensive Nationalism: The Birth of the Chinese Nation
Understanding how nationalism first emerged in China can help in understanding the
similarities and differences between nationalism in past and present China. By doing so, we can
better understand the causes that shape the formation of nationalism, the purpose nationalism
serves in given historical moments, and its strengths and/or limitations. Referencing back to the
victimization narrative noted in the new education material, the 19th century began what the
CCP refer to today as China’s “century of humiliation.” The glory and prestige of Chinese
imperial dynasty, one that had lasted for centuries before, was swept away as the modern
world forcefully made its introduction. Following its defeat at the hands of the British in the
First Opium War of 1839, 19th-century China soon found itself increasingly encroached upon by
foreign powers. Any serious attempts at reform or resistance were blocked by corrupt officials
or destroyed outright by modern European armies. War, rebellions, and famines plagued the
country; the ruling elite of the Manchu Qing Dynasty, seen as a foreign dynasty by many native
Chinese, was unable to reverse the damage already done.
At the tail end of the 19th century, nationalism and the national identity known today
first emerged within China. The Chinese people were not blind to the chaos gripping their
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country. For those who had travelled abroad and seen what the rest of the world had to offer,
nationalism represented “a new, urgent awareness of their relationship to foreign forces and to
the Manchus,” describing the Chinese as “a unit that must be mobilized for its own survival.”39
As the 19th century came to a close in China, these earliest variations and subcategories of
Chinese nationalism were ones centered on a set of defensive principles. Any variant of
nationalism mentioned in pre-21st century China will be classified as defensive nationalism. The
reasoning behind this label is linked to the primary purpose of such nationalism: to unite what
was considered the Chinese nation against encroachment by forces from outside the nation
and to protect what the Chinese nation saw as their homeland.
The first major event that espoused defensive nationalistic values was the Boxer
Rebellion of 1900, a movement that was distinctly anti-foreigner in its ideology. Emerging as a
religious and spiritual movement in 1898, the secretive society known as Boxers United in
Righteousness sought to protect themselves from what they saw as an encroachment of foreign
missionaries onto their lands during a time of chaos.40 Comprised mostly of young men from
the poorer rural classes, the Boxers first unleashed their anger on Chinese Christian converts
and their foreign missionaries before setting their sights on bigger targets. In Beijing, now with
the support of certain Qing officials, the Boxers laid siege to the foreign embassies and their
inhabitants. The siege lasted for over a month before a joint expeditionary force of 20,000 men
relieved the siege at Beijing.41 In the aftermath of the rebellion, harsh punishments were doled
out upon the Qing, further weakening their hold upon the fragile country. But as the Boxers
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were out of the picture, more ambitious revolutionaries were beginning to make significant
moves.
In Shanghai, A young revolutionary student named Zou Rong who had studied in and
been inspired by the westernization that Japan had undergone published his work The
Revolutionary Army in 1903.42 Unlike the Boxers, who had directed their hatred solely at
foreigners and Chinese Christian converts, Zou specifically targeted the Manchus and the ruling
Qing government as the ones to blame for China’s problems. He strongly attacked the Qing in
his work, dissecting how the Manchu Qing had shown great weakness in the face of foreign
incursion into China while continuing to treat the Han Chinese as nothing more than “a race of
slaves” as he puts it.43 He urged the Chinese to adopt the same westernization as Japan had and
completely dissolve the authority of the imperial dynasty.44 Zou would not live to see the
overthrow of the Qing dynasty, as he died in prison while on his way to being executed. 45
Both the Boxer Rebellion and Zou Fang’s revolutionary publication can be interpreted as
forms of ethnic nationalism. Ethnic nationalism is the most common subcategory of nationalism
that is described, and is considered to be the default variation of nationalism. It supports the
idea that particular ethnicities (the Han Chinese in this case) are singular nations that share
common ancestry and heritage. In the cases of the Boxer Rebellion and Zou Fang, ethnic
nationalism is using defensive principles of repelling foreign invaders and defending a nation’s
land. And in the present day, ethnic nationalism is also empowering certain ethnic groups
within China that seek to break away from the state and safeguard their lands. But under Xi
42
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Jinping, however, several aspects of ethnic nationalism are included in his more offensive
variation, including the idea of shared cultural memories that Ning Rou mentions in regard to
the “China Dream.”46
The simplicity of ethnic nationalism makes this particular subcategory of nationalism
quite exclusionary, however, as only those with both sufficient heritage and cultural ties could
ever be considered part of the nation, and not even cultural assimilation is enough to grant
other people membership. And while this variant of nationalism works well for states with
ethnically homogenous populations (such as Japan and Korea), China has never been and will
never be an ethnically homogenous state.
Throughout its entire 5000-year history, various peoples outside of the Han majority
would come to call China their home, including the very Manchus that ruled from Beijing. But
through its influence over the centuries, through a process called sincization, both Chinese
culture and the Chinese state gradually incorporated these ethnic minorities into the Chinese
nation. A revolution that sought to unite all of China could not solely rely on the Han ethnicity.47
Zhou might not have understood this, but his revolutionary work and radical modernization
philosophy would inspire one particular individual to see China’s revolution through.
Sun Yat-sen and his broad coalition of forces named the Revolutionary Alliance had
slowly grown in numbers and strength during the first decade of the 20 th century.48 Then, in
1911, an accidental bomb explosion in the city of Hankou sent the dominos falling, and soon
revolution engulfed the entirety of China. Pushing up from their power base in the south, the
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Revolutionary Army managed to hold off Qing loyalist forces as support grew from the
populace for the revolutionaries. At the beginning of January of 1912, Sun had been nominated
as president of the emerging Chinese Republic; by the end of the month, the child emperor Puyi
had abdicated the throne, ending over two thousand years of imperial dynastic rule in China. 49
With the old systems of state abolished, the Chinese people now had to craft their own
destiny though other means of government, as well as define what it still meant to be Chinese.
The decade following the overthrow of the Qing was one of chaos and confusion. Central
authority broke down, and individual warlords began to assert their control over provinces,
carving up the state into spheres of influence. In the southern province of Guangdong, Sun and
his political allies held onto their vision of a Revolutionary China. To aid in their grand vision for
the new Republic of China, Sun and his new political party the Guomindang (GMD, Nationalists)
put forth their official doctrine: the Three Principles of the People.50 The very first of the Three
Principles, mínzú (民族), is often translated directly as “nationalism.”51 However, Sun Yat-sen
and the GMD’s variation of government-spouted nationalism would take a far different
approach to unifying the country than that what had been proposed by ones such as Zou Fang.
Similar to Zou, the nationalism espoused by the GMD was defensive and anti-imperialist
in its foundations, designed to strengthen the Chinese and put forth the resolve to defend their
country from external threats. But while the ethnic nationalism of Zou focused most of his
anger on the Manchus and spoke to the Han Chinese almost exclusively, Sun and the GMD
“held that [their] goals included the full integration and sovereignty of all the Chinese people,”
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even those outside of the Han Chinese demographic.52 This was civic nationalism at work,
focusing on ideals instead of ethnicities; it sought to unify the nations of people living within
China under a singular ideal and a unified cultural identity that was distinctly Chinese to forge a
modern state that could stand on equal terms with the West and Japan. The rise in civic
nationalism within China can also be attributed to a rise in major literature and scholarly works
during the 1920’s that were very critical of China’s past and were harnessed by GMD in creating
a more modern image of China.
This defensive civic nationalism was most prominently detailed in the first official flag of
the Republic of China. Unlike the familiar red flag with a blue box and white sun that most
people today associate with the Republic of China and Taiwan, the original flag featured a much
more unique design. It was a series of five horizontal stripes of different colors that represented
the major ethnicities within the Chinese nation: red for the Han Chinese, yellow for the
Manchus, blue for the Mongols, white for the Tibetans, and black for the Hui Muslims. In
addition, Sun embarked upon an economic and industrial modernization program by 1920
under a centralization plan.53 But unlike the communists, Sun and the GMD wanted to prevent
conflict erupting between the social classes, as this “could only impair the unity [Sun]
considered necessary for national survival and national development.”54 Unfortunately for Sun
and his vision for a unified China, disunity plagued the country after his death in 1925 as
nationalists and communists battled in the streets and villages for dominion over China.
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While both factions were battling for the very soul of China, Japan watched with keen
eyes from a short distance. Sensing weakness, Japan expanded its imperial ambitions and
seized the province of Manchuria while the GMD were distracted fighting the CCP. 55 Six years
later, Japan declared all-out war against China, kicking off the beginning of a global conflict that
would merge with other wars to become the Second World War. The defensive nationalism
espoused by Sun and his successor Chiang Kai-shek in the GMD now faced the ultimate test; the
CCP under the new leadership of Mao Zedong also were influenced by defensive nationalism
for the sake of survival, but obviously intertwined with Marxist thought. Both factions realized
that ideological differences meant nothing if the Chinese nation that Sun built would be
destroyed by foreign invaders. From 1937 to 1945 both the GMD and CCP held out against the
Japanese invasion, spurred on by the national unity of the Chinese people.56
So what correlation does the old form of defensive nationalism under Sun Yat-sen have
with the more offensive variation that Xi Jinping espouses? In terms of similarities, both
nationalisms emerged in times of confusion and lack of direction. This was seen during the
collapse of China’s old imperial government in 1912 and was slowly building up in the decades
following the abandonment of traditional Marxist principles in the 1980’s to the 21st century.
Both also see their respective governments as the guardians of the Chinese nation, as
successors to the old imperial governments and as a unifying force to unify the country against
threats to its integrity.57 This last statement explains much of why the current CCP government
is harsh on its crackdowns of internal dissent among its various peoples. But the primary fuel
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that drove defensive nationalism in the past was very real threats to national sovereignty by
foreign powers such as Japan. Today there is no longer a nation that actively threatens China’s
sovereignty, so what can Chinese nationalism of the past still achieve? Thus, while the
defensive nationalism of old sought only to maintain the integrity of the Chinese nation, the
offensive variation seen today seeks to expand the influence of the Chinese nation outside of its
borders through a mix of both hard and soft power, inevitably coming into conflict with other
states.

Foreign Policy Shift: China’s Return to Prominence
As stated earlier, the current CCP regime under Xi Jinping utilize both the concept of
collective memory and the feeling of victimhood built upon by past decades of foreign
dominion over China to unify the Chinese people through the form of offensive nationalism
that leans towards the goal of the “China Dream.”58 For internal stability and restructuring of
the Chinese state, Xi’s administration has promised a reformed CCP, a sense of pride in being
Chinese, and an economic revival to increase China’s growth again.59 All of these factors
contribute to the dream of returning China to the glory of the old imperial dynasties when
China stood as the hegemon of Eastern world. To ensure that China stands out upon the world
stage, drastic changes are being made through a combination of hard and soft power.
One of the most prominent examples of China’s soft power grab is the increased and
important role that the country has regarding global economy and trade. Back in 2013, Xi’s
administration announced a massive infrastructure project along the Eurasian continent
58
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officially titled “One Belt, One Road”, more commonly referred to today simply the Belt and
Road Initiative.60 The initiative is heavily inspired by the Silk Road, an old system of trade across
the Eurasian continent. China was always the major power positioned at the eastern end of the
Silk Road, providing silk, porcelain, tea, and other goods to traders that would carry these
goods back west and inspire awe in foreigners. But with the rise in cheaper and faster
international sea trade, the old land-based Silk Road began to fade into obscurity. For Xi, this
historical trade route offers a myriad of possibilities.
With the construction business in China beginning to stagnate, the development of
infrastructure in the various Eurasian countries along the old Silk Road provides China’s cement,
steel, and construction industries an outlet to ship their goods and services. 61 In addition, these
infrastructure projects will increase China’s influence over various countries and their
governments, who will now be indebted to China for building their infrastructure. The countries
that benefit the most will more than likely have regimes that are very outspoken and
supportive of China and its initiatives. If the Belt and Road Initiative is successful, Allison
certainly believes that the geopolitical scale will shift in China favor.62
But for Allison and other academics such as Ning Liao, the economic growth and
expansion of its influence to neighboring countries is just the beginning for China under Xi
Jinping. In order for China to obtain the very ‘China Dream” that seeks to return the country to
its former prestige as a regional hegemon, it will inevitably have to ascertain is position with the
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United States, a country that for the past several decades has been the global peacekeeper.63 In
an ironic twist, the role of the United States as peacekeeper in the Asia-Pacific region is what
enabled China to experience the same years of peace and prosperity that resulted in massive
economic growth and technological modernization.64 But Xi and his administration have
decided that America is no longer needed in the Asia-Pacific region to maintain stability and
peace, and that “it is time for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of
Asia, and uphold the security of Asia.”65
The conflicting interests of China desiring to expand their influence and the United
States wanting to keep their foothold in the region spilled over in more than one part of the
Asia-Pacific Theater. As highlighted in the introduction to this paper, the attention surrounding
this conflict over the past several years centered on the territorial disputes in the South China
Sea. And it is here that China demonstrates the second component of its new foreign policy
focus: the use of hard power, particularly military strength. The most obvious example of this
can be seen in the number of island reclamation projects that China has undergone over the
past few years. According to official statistics, by June of 2015, China reclaimed 2,900 acres of
land in the disputed island chains, which then serve as bases for military ships and aircraft to
maintain direct control of the seas.66 More importantly, these island bases allow China to
project its power throughout the entirety of the South China Sea, a vital shipping passage that
fuels the world economy.
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To assert its position, China has not been afraid of using both its hard and soft power to
intimidate other countries in the region like Vietnam and the Philippines. But Japan is a
particular Asian country in this regard. It continues to have disputes with China over the islands
in the East China Sea, but also carries much historical baggage with it.67 Japan is not unaware of
this historical baggage; in fact, to the Japanese, it appears as if history is beginning to repeat
itself. For the policy makers of Tokyo reacting to the aggressive posturing of Xi’s China, there
are stark similarities between Xi’s China and Japan of the 1930’s, especially in regards to China’s
military interventions and seizure of territory.68 And as mentioned before, that troubled history
is something that the current Chinese administration is all too willing to use in flaring up
nationalistic support for their country. In their article discussing the comparisons to 1930’s
Japan by both China and modern Japan, authors Chung-in Moon and Seung-won Suh label two
versions of nationalism that are reemerging in Asia: proactive and reactive nationalism.69 The
concept of proactive nationalism that Chung-in and Seung-won suggest aligns closest with this
paper’s definition of China’s offensive nationalism. Compared to the reactive, defensive
nationalism that emerged in China previously and is currently emerging in other Asian countries,
proactive, offensive nationalism is a directed movement implemented from the top-down in
order to advance the desires of the state through the unified support of the people within the
nation.70
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Conclusion
A new form of nationalism is certainly on the rise in China, and it is important to identify
the variations of nationalism that have been integrated into current movements in order to
better understand what is happening and why. Apart from communism, nationalism has had
the largest impact on Chinese history in the 20th and 21st centuries, and in defining what is
known today as the Chinese nation. From its defensive conception as a purveyor of traditions,
the rejection of a foreign dynasty, and the founding principle of a modern state, to its current
offensive evolution as a remerging force for identity in the confusion of the globalized world,
Chinese nationalism has taken on several forms throughout its brief yet influential history.
In the 21st century, observers are rightly seeing a comeback of Chinese nationalism. But
this nationalism is not the same as the one that unified the nation one hundred years ago. The
old principles are being abandoned as China seeks rebirth as powerful nation on par with the
distant empires of old. The globalized world has left many confused as to their identity and
lacking a sense of belonging to a particular group. For a multi-ethnic nation such as China, this
lack of direction has created many of the problems that the country faces today, but it has also
allowed for strong men such as Xi Jinping to rise into positions of power with promises of
restoring glory to the nation in confusing times. Perhaps this movement will inspire millions of
Chinese to be proud of their Chinese heritage, and perhaps it could unify the country to tackle
the various problems that plague it internally. But it could also spiral out of control and awaken
the desire for war that has for decades laid dormant in the Asia-Pacific Theater.
As of the writing of this paper, the exact direction that China will take with its
new nationalistic approach has not been revealed yet. The current political and societal scenes
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remain on a knife’s edge. Now in a position of lifetime power, Xi will likely continue to pass
measures that will increase his already existing power; other countries will likely continue to
look on at China with increasing fear and suspicion, or some might end up joining China in its
efforts to establish influence in the region. The role that nationalism will play in future Chinese
politics and society remains a mystery. But if nationalism is allowed to continue its rhetoric and
promote a continued sense of ever-lasting victimhood with an increasingly aggressive posturing
to nations outside China’s borders, the Asia-Pacific region will head down a dark path that has
not been seen in over eighty years.
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